|
Return
to Legal Articles
Pennsylvania
Civil Remedies for Sexual Misconduct and the Lack of Civil Pursuit
Published by Philadelphia Lawyer Magazine,
Philadelphia Bar Association
Quarterly Magazine, Spring of 2003
Introduction
Did you know that one in four women in North America were molested
in childhood?
-There are 1.7 million reports of child abuse each year.
-Approximately one in seven males will have been sexually molested
before the age of 18.
-51.9% of U.S. women and 66.4% of U.S. men have been assaulted
by an adult caretaker as a child .
-Most victims of sexual misconduct suffer an identifiable emotional
injury causing ongoing limitations.
-Civil remedies for domestic and sexual misconduct exist where
an accident occurred and negligence exists.
Across America
there exists a judicial trend that favors victims of domestic
and sexual violence. Courts and juries alike, across the country
and in Pennsylvania, are awarding substantial civil damages to
these victims based in negligence. This analysis will focus largely
on Pennsylvania case law. We consider the theory, exception, damage
requirements, and legal outcomes under insurance liability claims
for sexual misconduct in Pennsylvania.
The Theory
Most General
Liability Insurance policies provide coverage for “personal
injury” or “bodily injury” arising out of an
“occurrence”. The term “occurrence” is
defined as “an accident, happening or event . . . (including)
repeated exposure to conditions which . . . results in personal
injury . . . during the policy period.”
A homeowner’s insurance policy covers emotional distress
injuries sustained by a victim sexually or physically abused under
the widely overlooked theory, “negligent Infliction of emotional
distress.” Under this theory, there is a threshold requirement
for each victim to produce substantial evidence of a physical
manifestation of the emotional distress. Review of Pennsylvania
law makes it clear that a plaintiff must allege physical harm
to sustain an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
The rule can be found in Section 436A of the Restatement (second)
of Torts:
If
the actor’s conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable
risk of causing either bodily harm or emotional disturbance to
another, and it results in such emotional disturbance alone, without
bodily harm or other compensable damage, the actor is not liable
for such emotional distress.
The
Exceptions
Most General Liability Insurance policies intrinsically exclude
coverage for intentional harm and for claims between named insureds
under the same policy. The exception for claims for intentional
harm is customarily accomplished by definition whereby an “occurrence”
is stated to be an accident, happening or event that is “unexpected
or unintended” by the insured, or by specific exclusion
for intentional acts.
Case law in Pennsylvania supports the exception for intentional
harm, including the leading case of Aetna Casualty and Surety
Company v. Roe, 650 A.2d 94 (Pa. Super 1994). In Aetna v. Roe,
the Court found that there is no negligence, and therefore no
coverage, in a child molestation situation because the molester
is committing a crime and an intentional tort is presumed, which
falls within the exclusion in every homeowner's insurance policy.
The Damage
Current high profile news events like the Catholic Priest sexual
abuse scandals and the corresponding personal injury lawsuits
have reinforced the well known fact amongst health care professionals:
sexual abuse causes severe emotional injury. The multi-million
dollar settlements and verdicts highlight the irony that while
personal injury attorneys scramble to attract the dearth of lower
back injuries, there has been a wealth of the often overlooked
and ignored emotional injury claims stemming from sexual misconduct.
The emotional injury cause of action, negligent or intentional
infliction of emotional distress is a personal injury cause of
action widely neglected by the legal community although it has
been gaining gradual increased recognition. Rachel Zoll of the
Associated Press reported that at least 300 civil lawsuits alleging
clerical sexual abuse have been filed in 16 states since January
of 2002, when the case of a pedophilic priest in Boston spurred
claims against Roman Catholic dioceses across the United States.
While the Catholic Priest child molestation scandal demonstrates
the paradigm of an emotional injury lawsuit – a relatively
obvious injury with a clear theory of liability against a wealthy
defendant – there exists a plethora of less obvious lawsuits
with severe emotional injury and an insurable defendant.
Sexual misconduct has devastating consequences that result in
severe damage to the victims and the intimate, emotional relationships
that they develop throughout their lives. Sadly, the victim often
does not seek desperately needed therapy and treatment because
of financial hardship and the lack of health insurance resulting
in an untreated serious health condition and years of suffering.
Fortunately, although it has not been widely explored, the law
has a window of opportunity to compensate the victim for the pain,
suffering, and humiliation caused by such misconduct.
Pennsylvania Law
In fact-specific circumstances, the law in Pennsylvania permits
victims of sexual misconduct to obtain significant monetary compensation
from the homeowner's insurance policy of the guardian of the plaintiff.
Unfortunately, an abuse victim cannot recover insurance benefits
from a lawsuit directly against the molester because all homeowner's
insurance liability policies contain an exclusion for intentional
and criminal acts.
Moreover, a lawsuit directly against the molester is financially
unfeasible due to the unlikelihood of financial recovery and the
lack of available insurance. However, when sexual misconduct occurs
in the custody of a guardian who is responsible for the safe keeping
of the child, and the guardian knows or should know of the potential
for abuse by the molester for whatever reason, then the victim
can often recover insurance benefits up to the limits of the guardian's
homeowner's insurance liability policy under the "negligent
infliction of emotional distress" theory. General Accident
Insurance Company of America v. Allen, et al, 708 A.2d 828 (Pa.
Super 1998).
In many cases, the damaging effect of sexual abuse is so crippling
to a child that the reports of a capable mental health provider
along with a family physician should meet the physical manifestation
of the injury as set forth in Section 436A of the Restatement
(second) of Torts. Logically, if a mental health care professional
opines that a victim needs therapy as a result of a sexual assault
or other domestic abuse, then the "compensable damage"
requirement has been met with the bills for the medical treatment,
counseling, and/or psychotherapy.
Although the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is primitive regarding
protecting its victims from sexual misconduct, (whereas New Jersey
is amongst the most victim-friendly), other Pennsylvania cases
have been issued which have wide reaching implications.
In Aetna v. Barthelemy, 33 F.3d 189 (3rd Cir. 1994), the third
Circuit predicted that Pennsylvania Courts would obligate a college
student's parents' home owners' insurance policy to defend him
against a negligence claim filed against him by another student
as a result of sexual relations with her while both were intoxicated
and in his dormitory.
In Aetna v. Barthelemy, a male Penn State University student,
Michael Barthelemy, promised a virgin female student, Ms. McSparran,
that he would give her a compact disc if she drank several shots
of rum. He told her that rum was no more intoxicating than beer
and served her several shots until she became intoxicated and
got sick. The two students then had sexual intercourse.
In McSparran’s Complaint, she alleged battery, negligent
or reckless conduct and negligent or reckless infliction of emotional
distress. In his Answer, Barthelemy alleged that the sex was consensual.
McSparran did not allege that Barthelemy used force of violence,
except for the battery count implications. Moreover, McSparran
asserted in each count that Barthelemy did not "expect or
intend that his conduct would cause the specific injuries that
were suffered by the Plaintiff as a result of his conduct."
The Court determined that the inferred intent rule to harm under
an insurance policy did not apply, which the Court previously
held applicable to an “exceptional case of sexual child
abuse by an insured adult,” Wiley v. State Farm Fire &
Cas. Co., 995 F.3d 457 (3d Cir. 1993).
In finding against the insurance company, the Court stressed that
there was no allegation that a crime was committed. “Just
a tort, not a crime.” The Court distinguished Wiley v. State
Farm, where the insurance company escaped coverage in the child
molestation case based upon the "transferred intent"
doctrine.
The implications of Aetna v. Barthelemy are extensive because
the number of ways that male carelessness results in non-consensual
sexual relations is immeasurable. In addition to Pennsylvania
Court’s willingness to entertain sexual conduct as “negligent
infliction of emotional distress, the Courts also seem to be willing
to expand the circumstances under which an abuse victim is owed
a duty. In Kramer v. Allen, 669 A.2d 360 (Pa.Super 1995), the
Court dismissed a negligence claim against the wife of a grandfather
who molested his own grandchildren while babysitting for them.
The claim was dismissed merely because the Court held that the
wife, who was unrelated to the children, did not have a special
relationship to the children and therefore did not owe a special
duty to the children, but the Court discussed this principal at
length. First, the Court cited Section 315 of the Restatement
(second) of Torts:
There
is no duty to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent
him from causing physical harm to another unless (a) a special
relation exists between the actor and the third person which imposes
a duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct, or
(b) a special relation exists between the actor or the other which
gives to the other a right of protection.
Kramer, 669 A.2d at 362. Because the wife was unrelated, the Court
only considered her duty as a property owner. However, this case
legally implicates any relative who has a special relationship
with the child for negligent supervision, so long as it can be
established that the custodial parent knows or should have known
of the risk of harm.
The opinions of the dissenting and concurring judges also provide
encouragement to those pursuing claims under the negligent infliction
of emotional distress theory. The concurring opinion would remand
the matter for a new trial on the issue of the step-grandmother’s
duty to warn, noting the contempt that society has for a bystander
who does not help an imperiled stranger at little risk to his
or her self. The concurring opinion anticipates that sooner or
later, extreme cases of morally outrageous and indefensible conduct
will change the old law, and this case's fact pattern is an example.
The Court states in its concurring opinion:
Just
because there is no Pennsylvania precedent for imposing any duty
upon [defendant] does not mean that this must be the rule in this
case. The facts of this case strongly implicate "our ideas
of morals and justice" and "the mores of the community."
Appellees, while mere licensees, were children. They were particularly
ill equipped to recognize and deal with the danger posed by their
grandfather. The bizarre details of [the molester's] pedophilic
practices which came out at trial demonstrate the exceptional
magnitude of this danger. Also, [plaintiff] had first-hand knowledge
of her husband's pedophilic practices. These weighty factors must
coalesce into some kind of duty.
Kramer at
367. The dissent provides even more encouragement for future claims
such as these, and would impose a duty of care against a property
owner based upon the attractive nuisance theory. The dissent reasoned
that since the law imposes an obligation on a landlord in relation
to children irrespective of the trespasser-licensee-invitee classification
in relation to dangerous artificial conditions of the land, so
it should also extend to known dangers of third persons with vicious
propensities. Pamela L. v. Farmer, 112 Cal. App. 3d 206, 169 Cal.
Rptr. 282 (1980). The dissent concluded:
To the extent that the law does not yet impose a duty upon a possessor
of land such as appellant to protect children from the known harmful
acts of known third persons, I would seize this opportunity to
do so ....
Kramer at 371-72.
In addition to the words of empathy in the concurring and dissenting
opinions in Kramer, the Pennsylvania legislature gave victims
advocates something to cheer about last summer. Section 5533(b)
of Title 42 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes were amended
to provide a statute of limitations of 12 years from the date
a sexual abuse victim reaches his or her age of majority (18).
SB 212 P.N. 2153 (2002). The new SOL is effective 60 days from
the date of signing which was June 28, 2002
The
Conclusion
The civil law in Pennsylvania with respect to sexual misconduct
claims is evolving. The line of authority outlined here demonstrates
that there are civil remedies for sexual misconduct victims under
negligence theories that are widely overlooked. Society continues
to become more aware of the unpleasant reality of domestic and
sexual misconduct and the Courts seem to be moving in the right
direction.
However, based upon the paucity of authority related to negligent
infliction of emotional distress, the law is primitive in relation
to the prevalence of domestic and sexual misconduct in our society
and the severe damage that the abuse victims suffer.
Personal injury attorneys can participate in the fight against
domestic abuse by remembering the emotional injury causes of action:
negligent infliction of emotional distress in the relation to
the availability of homeowners' insurance. In recognizing and
bringing infliction of emotional distress claims, personal injury
attorneys will assist and protect the most vulnerable members
of society —children and victims of domestic and sexual
misconduct.
G.
Lawrence DeMarco
Return
to Legal Articles
|